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1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEIGH FURNITURE & CARPET CO., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
T. RICHARD ISOM, d/b/a 
RICHARD'S FINE FURllISHINGS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 17264 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
Nature of the Case 
In an action filed by Plaintiff-Appellant Leigh Furniture 
& Carpet co. to cancel a contract for the sale of a furniture 
business located in St. George, Utah, Defendant-Respondent T. 
Richard Isom counterclaimed against the Plaintiff-Appellant 
Leigh Furniture, alleging that the Plaintiff and its President, 
W. S. Leigh, tortiously interferred with Defendant's business 
and prospective economic advantage by wilful and malicious 
conduct designed to force the Defendant out of business. 
(Respondent will cite the pages in the record as follows: 
Trial transcript, "Tr.--;" court file, "R.--," and exhibits, 
"Exh.--.") 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
On February 24, 1975, Plaintiff-Appellant Leigh Furniture 
commenced an action against Respondent to cancel a contract 
between the parties whereby Respondent Isom purchased a 
furniture business from Appellant. Respondent had paid 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
$53,000.00 of the $80,000.00 purchase pr~ce and tendered the 
balance of $27,000.00 prior to receiving notice that legal 
action had been conunenced. Appellant also sought to restrain 
Respondent from conducting any further business on the premises 
which were under lease from Appellant. (R. 1-8) 
Defendant Isom filed a Counterclaim against Appellant, 
alleging that Appellant and its principal owner, W. S. Leigh, 
engaged in a concerted course of intentional, malicious conduct 
designed to force Isom out of business and bring his business 
relationships to an end so that Plaintiff could take back the 
business and leased property. (R. 27-30; Appendix A attached 
hereto) 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict 
in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff in the 
amount of $65,000.00 general damages and $35,000.00 punitive 
damages. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict 
or for New Trial was denied by the trial court. However, the 
court determined that a remittitur of punitive damages to 20% 
would be "reasonable" and directed Defendant to accept a 
reduction of punitive damages to $13,000.00 or else a new trial 
"on the issue of punitive damages" would be granted. (R. 
115-16) Defendant accepted the renittitur, reserving his right 
of cross appeal. (R. 117) 
Following Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal herein, Defendant 
cross appealed on the issue of the remittitur of the punitive 
damages. 
2 I 
I 
! 
_.....,_ 
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Relief Sought on Appeal 
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmance and reinstatement 
by this Court of the jury's verdict and judgment for the full 
amount awarded by it. 
Statement of Facts 
Respondent takes issue with Appellant's Statement of Facts 
and "Abstract of Nitnesses" as being incomplete and laced with 
conclusions and opinions which appear to reargue the evidence 
presented to the jury. Appellant states facts favorable to 
Appellant's contentions and ignores substantial evidence which 
supports the jury's verdict. Furthermore, many of Appellant's 
statements are not supported by proper citations to the record 
on appeal. Therefore, Respondent provides the following 
statement of facts: 
Prior to 1969, w. s. (Dub) Leigh and his family owned and 
operated a furniture and interior decorating business known as 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. with stores in St. George, Cedar 
City and Kanab. (Tr. 90, 523-528) In the fall of 1969 Leigh 
contacted Respondent T. Richard Isom to see if Isom would be 
interested in working at the furniture store in St. George, 
Utah, and later buying the store. ('!{~ 90, 94, 324-26) Isom 
terminated his other employment in the State of Washington and 
came to St. George where he began employment under Leigh in 
charge of the store's business and sales records. The 
accounting and bookkeeping for all of the store owned by Leigh 
was done by Eldon Ashdown at the store in Cedar City. ('R?' 
326-28) 
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At first Leigh promised to sell the business to Isom and 
two other employees, Watkins and Francis Leany. Later discus-
sions about only Isom buying the St. George store occurred in 
May of 1970 when it appeared that Leany was not interested and 
Leigh was dissatisfied and unhappy with Watkins. (Tr. 95-97, 
329, 354) Leigh requested Respondent's father, Orville Isom 
(herein referred to as "Orville") , an attorney who had thereto-
fore done some legal work for Leigh, to draw up an agreement 
of sale between Leigh and Richard Isom. Although attorney 
Orville Isom advised Leigh to get another attorney, Leigh 
insisted that Orville prepare the agreement. Several drafts 
of the agreement were prepared for Leigh, who made suggestions 
and requested various changes. (Tr. 97-99) 
Ultimately, Leigh and Respondent Richard Isom executed a 
written agreement dated May 24, 1970 (Exh. 1, attached as 
Appendix B hereto), whereby Isom purchased all inventory, 
merchandise, equipment, fixtures and accounts, etc. of the St. 
George store. The purchase price of $80,000.00 was to be paid 
$20,000.00 down, with the balance to be paid over a ten-year 
period with interest. As security for the payment of the 
purchase price, Isom agreed to maintain inventory, cash and 
receivables of $60,000.00 and to provide Leigh with a physical 
inventory every three months and monthly financial statements. 
(Appendix B, pp. 1, 2; Tr. 354-56) 
The agreement also granted Isom a ten-year lease of that 
portion of Appellant's building in which the business was 
located, with an option to purchase the building when the 
4 
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purchase price for the business had been paid. (.Zl.pp. B-2, 4) 
The store had operated at a loss the first four months of 
1970, with a $8,000.00 deficit when Isom took over the business. 
(Exh. 44; Tr. 388) 
During December, January and February, 1971, Respondent 
began having problems with Leigh. In the winter of 1970-71, 
the building furnace required substantial repairs for which 
Isom paid the portion required by the agreement; but Leigh 
refused to pay the balance. (Tr. 359-60) 
Although he had given Isom an option to purchase the 
building, Leigh tried to sell it to others. l'lhen he discovered 
he could not sell the property subject to ~espondent's ten-year 
lease and option to purchase, he resolved to cancel the sales 
agreement and get Isom out. (Tr. 110, 547; Exh. 65) Leigh 
came to Orville in June, 1971, and voiced his dissatisfaction 
with the agreement and stated he wanted to sell the building--
"the whole ball of wax"--and that he ought to kick Richard out 
and put a padlock on the door. (Tr. 111-13) 
In a letter to Richard Isom, Leigh declared he had no 
agreement with Respondent and demanded that the latter walk 
out and return the business to Leigh. He represented that he 
had contacted people in Salt Lake City and California regarding 
purchasing the "complete package." (Exh. 65; Tr. 536-39) 
During this period Leigh also approached two store employees, 
offering to sell Isom's business to them. (Tr. 118) 
During 1971 and 1972, Appellant, through Leigh and its 
employees, harassed Richard in the operation of the store, 
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cPtl 
complaining about Isom' s performance and the way he did business, 
disrupting the employees and reducing the efficiency of the 
operation. (Tr. 120-24, 362-71, 386, 415-17, 419-20) On one 
occasion Leigh "stormed" into the store and interrupted 
Respondent, with a customer. Leigh complained about not getting 
monthly statements and claimed Respondent was in default of the 
sales agreement. He demanded a written response to his 
allegations. The customer left the store. (Tr. 360-61) 
Generally, Leigh would come into the store in a hostile 
manner, look over the business as if he had an interest in it 
and if it met with his approval. He complained about the 
parking of automobiles in the parking lot, about the merchandise 
in the store; told Richard whon he should and should not deal 
-,-
with µL 362, 515, 533); falsely accused Respondent of subletting 
the parking lot; and threatened to kick Respondent out and lock 
the door. (Tr. 371-72) 
Such visits occurred at least every week from Mr. Leigh, 
Mrs. Leigh or Mr. Ashdown. (Tr. 364, 367, 489, 495) Although 
all payments on the purchase of the store were made within the 
60-day grace period permitted by the contract, Leigh continually 
accused Isom of being in default for late payment. (Tr. 234, 
394) Mr. or Mrs. Leigh or Weldon Ashdown would come into the 
store and interrogate Isom about the inventory or financial 
statements, demanding that he date accounts receivable and 
accounts payable and state to whom, for what and when. (Tr. 
369-71, 415-17) In one week Richard received four letters 
complaining about the furnace or not getting statements or 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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reports. (Tr. 365) 
At Leigh's request, his accountant, Huskinson, called 
Orville to say there had to be a change in the business and 
that Richard would have to get some outside capital and someone 
with furniture experience. (Tr. 119-20) Leigh requested 
Orville to go to Brent Talbot, who owned Dixie Interiors, 
Richard's competitor, to request that Talbot come into the 
business. (Tr. 117, 122) Hhen Ashdown learned that the Isoms 
were talking to a Mr. Hayes Hunter, he informed Mr. Leigh, who 
in turn told Orville to forget any ideas about bringing in 
Hunter; that he didn't like him and wouldn't have him in the 
store. (Tr. 121-22, 544) Leigh also continued to openly 
complain that he was crazy to give Richard a ten-year lease and 
option and what he should do was kick Richard out and sell the 
store again himself. (Tr. 123-24) 
In December, 1971, Leigh, through his attorney, Gary Howe, 
demanded that Richard submit the business to an independent 
audit. (Exh. 2) Also, as a result of Leigh's refusal to pay 
all of the furnace plumbing repair bill, a lawsuit was filed 
by Moss Plumbing against Isom and Leigh in which Leigh asserted 
the obligation was entirely Isom's responsibility. (Tr. 136, 
151) This litigation later resulted in a determination that 
Leigh was liable for the repair bill. 
In September, 1972, in an effort to remove Leigh's threats 
to terminate Richard's business, Orville proposed to have 
Richard pay an additional $10,000.00 on the purchase price. 
(Tr. 124-26; Exh. 15) Appellant demanded that Isom prepay 
7 
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$20,000.00 and submit to a new agreement or else Leigh would 
sue to cancel and foreclose on Richard's business. (Exh. 21) 
Leigh's attorney sent Orville a copy of the Complaint which 
Leigh threatened to file. (Tr. 234-45; Exh. 33, attached as 
Appendix D) 
In an attempt to resolve all the problems between them 
and avoid "any future conflicts," Richard Isom acceded to 
Leigh's demand and raised $20,000.00 which he prepaid on the 
purchase price of the business. Respondent also signed a 
supplemental agreement dated September 28, 1972, wherein he 
agreed, inter alia, to obtain written approval from Leigh 
before bringing any additional person into the business; 
authorized Leigh to make biannual audits; and agreed to maintain 
a minimum of $64,000.00 in inventory, cash and accounts 
receivable. (Exh. 3, also attached hereto as Appendix C) 
By making the $20,000.00 prepayment on the contract 
principal in 1972, the principal balance was paid up to 1976. 
Only $27,000.00 was still owing to Leigh. (Tr. 125-35) 
Although the September, 1972, agreement was intended to 
resolve all the disputes between Leigh and Isom, Leigh continued 
to pursue two separate lawsuits against Richard Isom relating 
to the unpaid plumbing repair bill and a claim by Appellant 
against Isom and Frank Leany. (Tr. 136-37, 174, 184-85, 231, 
265) 
In the action filed by the plumber for his repair bill, 
Leigh continued to assert that Isom was liable. (Exh. 33, 
para. 4(g)) After a trial, the court required Leigh to pay 
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the bill. (Tr. 136-37) Likewise, with respect to Leigh's 
claim that Respondent was responsible for the amount of 
furniture drawn from the store by Leany, at the trial in 
January, 1973, the court dismissed Leigh's Complaint at the 
conclusion of his evidence. (Exh. 62; Tr. 174-78, 375, 414, 
540) 
Leigh continued to check up on Richard Isom during 1973. 
But because of the substantial prepaY_!llent, there was not much 
Leigh could do. (Tr. 137, 375-76, 381-82) Richard Isom was 
able to operate his business without Leigh's interference and 
turned a $27,000.00 net loss in 1970 into a $5,000.00 net 
profit in 1972 and a $17,700.00 net profit at the end of 1973. 
(Exhs. 45, 47, 48; Tr. 387) 
Isorn's store continued to do well into the spring of 1974, 
showing over $5,000.00 in profit through April, 1974. However, 
in April, 1974, harassment by Leigh started up again following 
the conclusion of the "plumbing" lawsuit. (Tr. 382-85) 
Leigh continually complained to Isom about the store's 
inventory, the air conditioner, allegedly delayed financial 
statements and the format of the financial statements. (Tr. 
382-85) Appellant refused to pay for a store window broken 
by the adjacent bicycle shop. (Tr. 385) The heating bills 
began to "pile up" since Appellant wouldn't.pay its share, 
requiring Respondent to make trips to Cedar City to clear up 
the matter. (Tr. 151, 261, 389) 
As the visitations by Appellant continued, Isom was 
required to spend a lot of time to deal with them and Leigh's 
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renewed threats of cancellation of the purchase contract. Sales 
began to drop off and the store became unproductive. (Tr. 386, 
415-16) Demand was made upon Isom to produce various documents 
and records, including renewed demands to date accounts payable, 
Isom was required to give more attention to Leigh than to the 
business. (Tr. 386, 389, 417, 420, 428, 611) 
In the summer of 1974, Orville followed the prior suggestio: 
of Leigh and approached Mr. Brent Talbot about joining Richard's 
Fine Furnishings. Mr. Talbot had recently left Dixie Interiors, 
(Tr. 117, 122, 137; Exh. 5) Accordingly, in July, 1974, Orville 
Isom wrote to Leigh and Leigh's attorney requesting Leigh's 
approval to bringing Talbot ·into the business. (Exhs. 5, 6) 
When no response from Appellant was forthcoming, attorney 
Orville Isom again wrote to Leigh requesting a response, 
outlining the advantages to Leigh and the need to proceed so 
as not to lose the opportunity with Talbot. (Exh. 7) No 
response was received from Leigh. (Tr. 144, 542) 
On July 22, 1974, Leigh's attorney stated to Orville that 
if Talbot was interested in coming into the business, he would 
have to contract directly with Leigh and the Leigh/Isom 
agreement would have to be terminated. (Exh. 34) Even after 
extensive correspondence and a tentative verbal agreement 
between Isom and Talbot, Orville was unable to get Leigh to 
agree to Respondent bringing in Talbot unless Isom agreed to 
terminate his contract and the ten-year lease. (Tr. 217, 457; 
Exhs. 24, 26-29, 31, 36) f~reover, Leigh continued to insist 
that Isom pay him the $4,000.00 involved in the Leany lawsuit 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which had been dismissed by the court. (Exh. 26) 
Leigh admitted that he would not let Talbot come into the 
business under Isom's "long term" lease. Leigh insisted that 
Isom "step out" of the store and turn it back to Leigh. (Tr. 
155-56, 169, 213-16, 547) When Orville also requested Leigh's 
permission to permit a Mr. Applegate to come into the store 
under Richard's contract, no response was ever received from 
Leigh. (Tr. 146-50, 404; Exhs. 10, 11) 
The harassment and demands from Leigh continued and occupied 
a considerable amount of Respondent's time and attention. (Tr. 
371-72, 386) By the end of 1974, it became apparent that Isom 
would have to pay off the $27,000.00 remaining on the purchase 
to keep Leigh from active interference in the affairs of the 
store. Richard spent a lot of time raising the funds instead 
of operating the business. (Tr. 164, 393-94) 
Leigh's continuing threats to kick Richard out had only a 
demoralizing effect on the business. (Tr. 396, 419, 428, 611) 
The practice of Leigh and Ashdown coming into the store lost 
business and Isom received complaints and comments from his 
customers. (Tr. 466-67) Instead of maintaining the comfortable 
profit built up by August, 1974, the business steadily declined 
as a result of the problems with Appellant. By December, 1974, 
Respqndent's books indicated he had suffered a $6,499.00 net 
loss. (Exh. 49; Tr. 419, 421, 611) 
On December 29, 1974, Orville Isom met with Leigh in San 
Francisco where he informed Leigh that Richard was making plans 
to pay the last $27,000.00 owed. Leigh replied that that was 
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II 
OK, but he again rejected bringing Talbot into the store with 
the long-term lease and option. He claimed he "had got to move 
the property," get rid of the headache and get the property 
back from Respondent. Leigh again demanded that Richard "step 
out" of the store, liquidate the stock and turn it back to 
Leigh. (Tr. 155-57) Leigh also refused to appoint an appraiser 
as required by the written agreement so that Isom could exercise 
his purchase option. (Tr. 157; Appendix A-4) 
Orville again met with Leigh and his attorney on February 
14, 1975, and told them that the $27,000.00 would soon be paid. 
Since Leigh claimed to be concerned about the inventory as 
security, Orville Isom agreed to permit an inventory to be 
taken if Leigh would appoint an appraiser as required by the 
contract. (Tr. 158-60) Leigh maintained he had "an offer" 
to sell the property for $200,000.00 (without the Isom lease} 
and therefore would not sell it to Isom for its appraised value 1 
of approximately $125,000.00 to $140,000.00, subject to the 
lease. (Tr. 159-60, 273) After the meeting, Leigh again 
refused to appoint an appraiser so that Isom could exercise 
his purchase option. (Tr. 161; Exh. 13) 
Without giving any notice of default, on February 24, 
1975, Leigh filed the Complaint in the instant action to cancel 
and terminate Isom's interest, forfeit his payments theretofore 
made and restrain him from doing further business. (Tr. 394; 
R. 1-8, Complaint attached as Appendix E hereto) This complaint 
was substantially identical to Leigh's proposed Complaint in 
1972, even though the prior matters had been resolved by Isorn's 
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prepayment of $20,000.00. 
397-98) 
(Compare Appendixes D & E; Tr. 234-45, 
Unaware that the Complaint had been filed, Richard Isom, 
by letter of February 26, 1975, tendered to Leigh the remaining 
$27,000.00 which had been deposited in Dixie State Bank. (Exh. 
14) Isom requested that Leigh receipt for the payment, appoint 
an appraiser to permit the option to be exercised and accept 
Brent Talbot as an associate with Richard to operate under the 
present lease. (Exh. 16; Tr. 164-66, 455-57) 
When Orville Isom learned of the suit, he contacted Leigh's 
attorney, who replied not to worry. Since Richard had not been 
served, they could still negotiate. (Tr. 167-68) When Richard 
Isom learned of the lawsuit, it had a demoralizing effect; but 
he still tried to deal with Leigh and continued to do business 
through February, 1975. No response to the tender was ever 
received by Richard, although Leigh told Orville he would never 
allow Talbot to come in under Richard's lease. (Tr. 169-70, 
396-97) 
In March of 1975, while talking to a customer in his store, 
Respondent was served with Leigh's Complaint. Upon reading the 
Complaint, Respondent noted that it reopened the wounds of 
1970-72 and looked liked the same Complaint Leigh filed 
previously. (Tr. 397) Because of the restraining order, 
Respondent did not feel that he could conduct further business 
and so he closed the store. (Tr. 396-99) As a result, Richard's 
Fine Furnishings ceased to do business and Respondent was forced 
into bankruptcy. (Tr. 400-405, 421-22, 466-67) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant attempts to re-argue the evidence before 
this Court, ignoring the substantial evidence in the record 
contrary to Appellant's claims. A proper review of the entire 
record will support the jury verdict. 
Appellant was properly held liable for tortious 
interference and intermeddling in Respondent Isom's business 
expectancies and prospective economic advantages. One who 
engages in a concerted course of conduct to force another out 
of business by harassment and tortious conduct is liable to 
the one injured for the native consequences of the result he 
intended. There is also ample evidence to support the finding 
that the Appellant in no way was privileged. 
Relating to Respondent's cross appeal, the trial 
court erred when it invaded the "sound discretion" of the jury 
by deciding to a remittitur of punitive damage simply because 
"a reasonable ratio" is twenty percent. 
The jury verdict of $65,000 compensatory damages 
and $35,000 punitive damages awarded to Respondent should be 
reinstated in its entirety. The trial court's remittitur should 
be reversed and in all other respects the matter should be 
affirmed. 
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POINT I 
THE JURY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED. 
Throughout its Brief, Appellant attempts to reargue the 
weight of the evidence presented to the jury. In so doing, 
Appellant ignores much of the evidence contrary to its claims. 
As specifically set forth in the foregoing Statement of Facts, 
the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence and should 
be affirmed by this Court. 
Moreover, Appellant's Notice of Appeal indicates that 
Appellant appeals only from the denial of its "Motion for Judg-
ment Notwithstanding Verdict or for New Trial." (R. 118) The 
standard of review for an appeal from the denial of Appellant's 
post-trial motion is whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to grant a new trial. Pollesche v. Transamerican 
Insurance co., 27 U.2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972). Appellant 
makes no showing here that there was any abuse of discretion 
by the trial court. 
Therefore, the issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
properly submitted the case to the jury, considering the evidence 
in a light most favorable to Respondent Isom and the verdict. 
Schow v. Guardtone Inc., 18 U.2d 135, 417 P.2d 643 (1966); 
Whyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1976). The jury 
had the exclusive duty to find the facts. In so finding, the 
jury may weigh, accept or reject any conflicting evidence as 
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it may choose. A jury finding for the claimant must be viewed 
as accepting the claimant's version of the transaction 
notwithstanding contrary evidence. Basin Electric PoweL 
Cooperative--Missouri Basin Power Project v. Howton, 603 P.2d 
402 (Wyo. 1979). 
"Reviewing courts will view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, will indulge in all reasonable 
inferences in support of the verdict and 
will disregard all inferences and evidence 
to the contrary." Terrel v. Duke City 
Lumber co., Inc., 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d 
1021 (1974), modified 540 P.2d 229 (1975) 
This Court does not substitute its views for the jury's 
unless there is no competent evidence to support the verdict. 
Fillmore Products Inc. v. Western States Paving Inc., 592 P.2d 
581 (Utah 1979); Snyderville Transportation Co., Inc. v. 
Christensen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980); Uinta Pipeline Corp. 
v. White Superior co. 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976). 
It is axiomatic that the reviewing court will presume 
that the jury believed the evidence which sustains its 
finding. Appellant's claims that Respondent had no business 
expectation or relationship or that the Appellant was justified 
in his malicious, intentional conduct were rejected by the 
finders of fact. Gessner v. Dairymen Association, Inc., 611 
P.2d 713 (Utah 1980). It was the jury's prerogative to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses and determine the facts. Whether 
or not Respondent Isom had a reasonable expectation of business 
16 
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success or advantage or whether Appellant acted reasonably 
or was justified were jury questions to be determined from 
the evidence in the record and, having been properly submitted 
to the jury, the latter's findings will not be interfered with 
on appeal. Moore v. Prudential Insurance co. of America, 26 
U.2d 43, 491 P.2d 227, 230 (1971). 
Appellant has not demonstrated any "substantial prejudice" 
or "injustice." Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 
548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1976). Indeed, it appears to Respondent 
that "justice" has been well served in this matter by the jury's 
verdict. Therefore, the jury's verdict should be affirmed 
and reinstated in its full amount as hereinafter set forth. 
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POINT II 
THE FINDING OF THE JURY THAT APPELLANT IS LIABLE TO ISOM 
FOR ITS INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ISOM' S BUSINESS 
RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Appellant Leigh claims that Respondent's Counterclaim must 
fail because Respondent failed to prove a specific existing 
contract with a third party. (Appellant's Brief at 14-16) As 
previously cited, the evidence before the jury amply supports 
Respondent's claims that the actions of Leigh were designed and, 
in fact, did drive Richard Isom out of business, thereby 
terminating his business relationships with his custoners and 
others. By greatly over simplifying of Respondent's claim and 
the developing law regarding interference with business 
relationships, Appellant mischaracterizes both. Throughout its 
Brief, Appellant merely attempts to knock down a "straw-man" of 
its own fabrication. 
Although of comparative recent development, the law has 
long recognized that a broad range of economic relationships 
are entitled to its protection from unreasonable interferences. 
Many courts have tended to avoid a complete analysis of the 
problem and taken refuge in simplified formulas, thereby 
enshrouding the law in "a fog of catch words and rubber-stamped 
phrases" upon which Appellant attempts to rely. B. Izett, 
"Interference with Contracts at Will, A Problem of Public 
Policy," 25 Brooklyn L. R. 73, 74 (1957-59); Prosser, Handbook 
of the Law of Torts, §129, p. 927 (4th Edit., 1971). 
By attempting to hide behind a purported lack of a valid, 
existing third-party contract, Appellant ignores the fact that 
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interference with a specific contract is merely a "subclass" of 
the responsibility imposed on those who intentionally interfere 
with business relationships. It is only one of several segments 
of the law in which dC!JT\ages may be recovered for unlawfully 
causing loss to a person in his business relationships. 
Buckaloo v. Johnson, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 537 P.2d 865 (1975); 
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §130, pp. 949-53 (4th 
Ld., 1971); Restatement of Torts, Second, Chapt. 37, §§766A, 
766B, pp. 4-23 (1977); G. Alexander, Commercial Torts, §§6.1, 
6.4, pp. 337, 348 (1973); 1 F. Harper and F. James, Law of Torts, 
§6.5, pp. 489-495 (1956); J. Estes, "Expanding Horizons in the 
Law of Torts--Tortious Interference," 23 Drake Law Review 341, 
342 (1973-74); F. Harper, "Interference with Contractual Relations," 
47 Northwestern U. L. R. 873 (1953). 
Included in this area of the law entitled to protection 
from wrongful interference are the expectancies of future 
contractual relations, the opportunity of obtaining and 
maintaining customers and the right to conduct and operate one's 
own business. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946, 947 
. 
(1909); Surnwalt Ice co. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 Md. 403, 
80 Atl. 48, 50 (Md., 1911); Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 C.A.2d 796, 
286 P.2d 474 (1955); \Villiams v. Maloof, 157 S.E.2d 479 (Ga., 
1969); Calbom v. Knudzton, 65 Wash.2d 157, 396 P.2d 148, 151-52 
(1964); Sharnhart v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 159 Fla. 629, 32 
So.2d 727 (1947); General Beverage Sales Co.--OSH KOSH v. East 
Side \linery, 396 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Wis. 1975); F. Sayre, 
"Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 Harvard L. R. 663, 701-702 
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(1922-23); J. Dale, "Interference with Business Relation," 5 
U.C.L.A. L. R. 341 (1958); 45 Arn. Jur. 2d, Interference, §§49-Si, 
pp. 321-24 (1964). Prosser recognizes that one of the business 
expectancies covered by the tort is "the opportunity of 
obtaining customers;" the loss resulting from interference can 
be measured by looking at the "background of business experience" 
rather than a specific, narrow relationship. Prosser, supra, 
at 950. 
Society seeks to protect the interest of the individual in 
the security and integrity of business transactions and the 
freedom of the individual to make contracts. The law also draws 
a line beyond which no member of the community may go in 
interrupting contractual negotiations or otherwise intentionally 
intermeddling in the business affairs of others. Instead of 
the interest in the security of contracts already made, 
Respondent's interests to be protected are those of a reasonable 
expectation of economic advantage and a fair opportunity to 
conduct a legitimate business without interruption. 1 Harper 
and James, supra, at 510. Prosser, supra, at 949-51; 36 Harvard 
L. R., supra. 
While this Court has in the past encountered cases involvinc 
interference with existing contractual relationships, Respondent 
is not aware of any case where a claim of interference with 
business expectancies or other relationship not solidified by 
contract has come before the Court. See Gammon v. Federated 
_¥ilk Producers Association, Inc., 14 U.2d 291, 383 P.2d 402 
(1963); Soter v. Wasatch Development Corp., 21 U.2d 224, 443 
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P.2d 663 (1968). 
Appellant's confusion in this area of the law is readily 
apparent when viewing the inconsistencies of its argument. 
Appellant claims that Respondent failed to prove a specific 
third-party contract and that Appellant Leigh is not liable in 
tort for malicious conduct in breaching its own contract with 
Richard Isom. Even assuming that to be the case, such is a 
mischaracterization of Respondent's claim. The gravamen of 
Respondent's claims, as stated in the Counterclaim, is that by 
intentional, malicious conduct in breach of its contract with 
Isom, Appellant Leigh forced Isom out of his retail furniture 
business, achieving the very result he intended. Counterclaim, 
Appendix A. 
More specifically, the evidence presented to the jury was 
conclusive that Leigh interferred with Richard's business by 
Leigh's complaints, harassment, falacious claims and lawsuits 
and threats to "kick Richard out." (R. 113, 118, 122, 133-35, 
144-47, 155-57, 169, 185, 261; Exh. 65) Having received 
$53,000.00 of the purchase price, Leigh deliberately refused 
to comply with his agreement to appoint an appraiser or to even 
respond to Richard's requests to associate others in his business. 
All this was motivated by Leigh's animosity for Richard and by 
an apparent compulsion to cancel the lease and take back the 
business so that Leigh could resell it and the property at a 
greater profit. (Tr. 158, 161, 213-16, 272-73, 547; Exh. 65) 
Substantial evidence in the record indicates that Leigh's 
conduct adversely affected Isom's operation of the business and 
21 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his relationship with his customers. (Tr. 361, 363-64, 368-71, 
386, 419-20, 466) And it cannot be ignored that, when left 
alone, Respondent was successful enough to turn Leigh's $ 8, ooo. oo 
loss in 1970 into a $5,500.00 net profit in 1972 and a $17,000.oo 
net profit in 1973. (Tr. 388; Exhs. 47, 48) Isom' s business 
continued profitable in 1974 until Leigh resumed his harassment 
tactics. (Tr. 386; Exh. 49) By the beginning of 1975, when 
served with the Complaint and Restraining Order, it was obvious 
to Isom that he could not continue when his time, attention and 
resources were being drained by Appellant. (Tr. 386, 393-98, 
417, 421, 428-29, 455, 611) 
Appellant does not seem to recognize that it substantially 
interferred with Respondent's valid business expectancies and 
potential economic advantages with Respondent's customers and 
suppliers--relationships to which Appellant was not a party. 
Certainly it would be reasonable to expect that absent Leigh's 
interference, Isom would continue a profitable business relation· 
ship with past and future customers and suppliers. Clark v. 
Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Iowa, 1970). Although Respondent 
showed substantial harm to his business resulting in bankruptcy, 
he need only have shown injury to economic relationships with 
only a "probability of future economic benefit." Buckaloo v. 
Johnson, supra, at 872. 
Liability for interference with a business may be predicated 
upon conduct making performance of one's business more burdensome' 
more expensive, less profitable. Goodall v. Columbia ventures 
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (S.D.N.Y., 1974); Lipman v. Bri~ 
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Elementary School District, SS C.A.2d 224, 3S9 P.2d 46S (1961); 
North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Plymouth Mutual Life 
Insurance Co., 266 F. Supp. 231 (E.D. Pa., 1967); Scymanski v. 
Dufault, 80 Wash.2d 77, 491 P.2d 1050 (1972); Tippett, Jr. v. 
Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. App., 1973), aff'd SOl S.W.2d 874; 
1 Harper & James, supra, at 499-500; Restatement of Torts, 
Second, §766B, p. 22; C. Carpenter, "Interference with Contract 
Relations," 41 Harvard L. R. 728 (1927-28). 
Liability attaches to one who by his unlawful or belligerent 
conduct drives away or interferes with the customers of a 
business. Drouet v. Moulton, 24S C.A.2d 667, S4 Cal. Rptr. 278 
(1966); Guillory v. Godfrey, supra; Twin Falls Farm & City 
Distributing, Inc. v. D&B Supply Co., Inc., 96 Ida. 3Sl, 528 
P.2d 1286, 1294 (1974); Shamhart v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 1S9 
Fla. 629, 32 So.2d 727 (1947); Prosser, supra, at 949. And, 
the interference by Appellant directly with Isom's business and 
Isom's performance of his relationships with his customers is 
just as much an actionable wrong to Respondent as an inducement 
of some breach by the third-party customer. Goodall v. Columbia 
Ventures, Inc., supra, 1 Harper & James, supra, at 500; Corbin, 
Contracts, §947; Restatement of Torts, Second, §766A, pp.8, 17; 
23 Drake L. R., supra, at 883; 47 Northwestern U. L. R., supra, 
at 883. 
The authorities universally agree that when interference 
with future or potential business relationships (including 
customers) or other economic advantage is shown, proof of a 
specific, existing contract is not necessary. Skeels v. 
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c/2JJ. 
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 848 (3d Cir., 196{ 
Buckaloo v. Johnson, supra, at 871; Azar v. Lehigh Corp., 364 
So.2d 860 (Fla. App., 1978); Glenn v. Point Park College, 441 
Pa. 474, 242 A.2d 895 (1971); King v. City of Seattle, 84 wash.i 
239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974); Scymanski v. Dufault, supra, at 1054; 
Restatement of Torts, Second, §766B (1977); 
___ , "Intentionai 
Interference with Basic Relations," 3 Rutgers L. R. 277, 278-79 
(1948-49); 23 Drake L. R., supra, at 344. 
In addition to the relationship between Isom and his "thirc· 
party" customers, Appellant also interferred with Isom' s agreerne 
'• I bc.-f 
and business relationship with Brent-Hunte£-in demanding that 
Richard agree to cancel his ten-year lease before Leigh would 
Ii. f bei 
okay ~r. (Tr. 169-70; Exhs. 26, 34) No reason was given 
for this refusal other than that Leigh wanted his property back, 
freed from Isom' s option to purchase. Leigh also demanded that 
Toi bo-f 
Hu'f'lte:i; contract directly with Leigh Furni ture--at more favorable;· 
terms to Appellant, of course. (Exhs. 26, 31; Tr. 169, 213-16, 
/v 1"6-i 
252) Leigh even tried to deal privately with..fi.w'.l.t.er, behind 
Isorn's back. (Exh. 37) 
Both Orville and Richard Isom testified that Richard had 
7-;11o..,7 
reached an oral agreement from Hw1Lex as to his association with 
Richard and the purchasing of the property. (Tr. 217, 4 5 7, 
612-14) Whether the relationship between Isom and "third-party" 
folbC'7 
HuMer was an oral agreement or just still "prospective," it 
was still a relationship entitled to protection from Appellant's, 
interrneddling and interference. 
I 
Appellant claims that because it did not induce the breach 
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--
of a third-party contract, Respondent had only a remedy for 
breach of contract. (Appellant's Brief at 25-26) Yet the 
authorities cited by Appellant do not support Appellant's 
position. For example, Corbin, Contracts, specifically states 
that breach of an implied promise not to prevent or hinder 
performance of the contract can be the basis for an action in 
tort. 
[A] and prevention or hindrance should clearly be 
regarded as wrongful. It is practically immaterial whether 
the implied promise is a fiction of the court to attain a 
desirable result or is a justifiable inference of fact. 
In some cases the wrongful conduct could have been treated 
as a tort; and it can still be so treated if the courts 
find it of advantage in the course of justice ..•. 
Corbin on Contracts, §947, p. 814. 
Even as to the contract between Appellant and Respondent, 
Leigh's conduct in forcing Isom out of business was beyond a 
mere breach of contract. 
Respondent submits that Appellant's conduct was not just 
a breach of contract, but also constituted unlawful, tortious 
interference with Isom's business. 23 Drake L. R., supra, at 
350-51. In Buxbom v. Smith, 145 P.2d 305 (Cal., 1944), liability 
was affirmed for interference with the plaintiff's business where 
the defendants gained "unfair advantage" over the plaintiff 
through their contractual arrangements with the plaintiff. The 
California court noted the plaintiff's reliance upon the 
defendants' performance of the contract and the defendants' 
unjustified repudiation of their obligations and attempting to 
take over the business. Id. at 311. 
Other courts have affirmed liability for the tortious 
conduct of trying to force a plaintiff out of business when a 
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contract between the parties was the basis for the defendants' 
malicious conduct, such as in the instant case. Cherberg v. 
Peoples National Bank of Washington, 88 lvash.2d 595, 564 P.2d 
1137 (1977); Drouet v. Moulton, supra; Terrell v. Duke City 
Lumber Company, Inc., supra; Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corp. , supra. 
In Cherberg, a landlord refused to repair the leased prernis; 
and terminated plaintiff's lease, forcing the plaintiff restaun: 
to close. The evidence disclosed that the landlord merely desir; 
to regain control of the premises in order to erect a new build;: 
"which they felt r.iight be more profitable." The appeals court 
held that a lessee should not recov.er in tort for breach of dut;, 
arising out of the lease. The lvashington Supreme Court reversed 
the appellate court, reinstating the jury award. 
The court held that the wilful refusal by the landlord to 
make repairs when under a contractual duty gave rise to an 
action in tort for intentional interference with the tenant's 
business relationship with its customers. Recovery in tort was 
not denied simply because the tortious conduct "may also be 
viewed as a breach of an implied duty under the lease." 564 
P.2d at 1142. 
The court stated that: 
It appears to be the general view that, in those instances 
in which the conduct of the breaching party indicates a 
motive to destroy some interest of the adverse party, a 
tort action ,may lie and items of damage not available in 
contract actions will be allowed. 564 P.2d at 1143. 
That court wisely distinguished the older cases of ~ 
Chrysler Corp., 45 Wash.2d 586, 277 P.2d 708 (1954); and~ 
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y. Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 200 A.2d 416 (1964) (cases cited in 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 18, 24) as incidents where interference 
with business were only an incidental consequence of the 
defendant's conduct. But, in Cherberg, as in the instant case, 
the motive and purpose of the defendant's conduct was to force 
its lessee out of business in order to retake the property--a 
result achieved in each case. (Tr. 169-70, 547) 
In Drouet v. Moulton, supra, the defendant sold his tavern 
to the plaintiff. With the purchase payments still owing, the 
defendant engaged in conduct intent to destroy plaintiff and 
regain control of the business. The defendant attempted to 
accelerate plaintiff's payments under the contract and harassed 
plaintiff and plaintiff's customers to the extent that plaintiff's 
liquor license was revoked and plaintiff could no longer operate 
as a tavern. The court found it was reasonable for the plaintiff 
to elect to close up rather than continue to accumulate expenses 
without receipts to meet them. In sustaining the jury's verdict 
of general and punitive damages, the court stated that 
. malicious interference with a business is a tort . 
for which general damages may be recovered to the extent of 
the foreseeable consequences of appellant's conduct. 
These damages may include loss of profits and injury to 
the value and reputation of a business. (citations 
omitted) 54 cal. Rptr. at 282. 
See, also, Guillory v. Godfrey, supra. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal likewise held that a 
defendant creditor's breach of financing arrangements with the 
plaintiff by seizure and removal of the financed vehicles would 
present a jury question of whether such conduct constituted 
interference with "prospective economic advantage." Skeels v. 
27 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., supra. Although reversing an 
award of punitive damages, the court affirmed the jury verdict 
that the defendant's wilful, tortious conduct destroyed 
plaintiff's business. 
In Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., supra, that court 
affirmed that the conduct of the business lender directed toward 
the goal of ruining the plaintiff's business and acquiring its 
assets was tortious. Defendant Duke City contracted to finance 
the plaintiff but later refused to advance more money unless the 
plaintiff acceded to various demands to turn over portions of 
the business to the defendant. Additionally, the defendant 
usurped much of plaintiff's time and forced the defendant to 
sign a disadvantageous supplemental agreement. Although the 
amount of damages awarded Terrel was modified by the New Mexico 
Suprel'!le Court, the defendant's liability in tort was affirmed. 
540 P.2d at 229. 
Although Leigh relies upon the Restatement of Torts, Second, 
1 
Appellant ignores its very language in its argument. (Appellant\ 
Brief at 16-17) Section 766 relates to liability for inducing 
the breach of a subsisting contract by a third person. 
Restatement of Torts, Second, §766, supra, at 7-8. As previously 
noted, Respondent has not exclusively relied upon such a claim 
in this case. 
Section 766A of the Restatement, Second, states the rule 
for intentional inte.rference with another's performance of his 
own contract with a third person. Liability is imposed upon 
improper interference with a contract between another and a 
28 
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third person by preventing the performance of the other or by 
causing his performance to be more expensive. Restatement, 
Second, supra, at 17. There cannot be any question from the 
record that Leigh's conduct did, in fact, increase the burden 
and expense to Isom in enjoying his reasonable business 
relationships with customers and suppliers. (Exhs. 45-49) 
Appellant argues "no contract shown--therefore, no liability." 
Yet Section 766B expressly imposes liability on the intentional 
interference with "prospective contractual relations" by 
"preventing the other [Isom] from acquiring or continuing the 
prospective relation." Restatement, Second, supra, at 20. This 
section is designed to protect against interference if the 
"potential contract" would be of pecuniary value to Plaintiff. 
Included are "interferences with the . opportunity of selling 
or buying land or chattels or services and any other relations 
leading to potentially profitable contracts." Ibid. at 22. 
As previously discussed, this section of the Restatement is 
designed to afford protection to business relations, including 
those of customer and supplier, and the freedom to conduct one's 
own business affairs. 
Appellant argues that the primary reason for Isom's business 
problem was a lack of working capital. (Appellant's Brief at 
22) In its attempt to reargue the weight of evidence, Appellant 
has selectively culled Respondent's testimony out of context, 
ignoring other substantial evidence supporting the jury's 
verdict. (Tr. 371-72, 386-87, 389, 396, 415-22, 428, 466) 
Appellant even omits Respondent's following testimony that there 
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was "no other basis upon which [Respondent] filed bankruptcy 
other than the actions of Leigh Furniture. . . (Tr. 421) 
While claiming that Respondent's business failed for lack 
of working capital, Appellant conveniently avoids the fact that 
in 1972, Richard Isom had raised $20,000.00 for additional 
working capital for the business but was forced to make a 
substantial prepayment to Leigh to alleviate Leigh's continual 
threats to cancel the contract. (Exh. 21; Tr. 421, 122-25) 
But for Leigh's unreasonable, extra contractual demands, 
Respondent would have had additional operating capital. 
All the evidence was properly submitted for the jury's 
consideration, including the testimony claimed by Appellant to 
support its opinions. Appellant's views were properly rejected 
by the jury on the basis of the entire record. The jury's 
determination that Leigh intentionally and maliciously 
interferred with Respondent's business relationships, both 
present and future, is adequately supported by the record. 
Leigh was properly held liable by reason of his conduct of 
tortious interference and the jury verdict should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S MALICIOUS AND INTENTIONAL CONDUCT WAS NOT 
PRIVILEGED. 
Appellant also claims a privilege by its harassment and 
interference with Respondent's business in that Leigh acted 
to protect his investment. It should be noted that the only 
evidence from the record from which Appellant can support its 
claim of privileged conduct is Leigh's own self-serving testimony. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 29) 
Respondent certainly agrees that in certain cases, lawful 
conduct which interferes with the business of others may amount 
to justification. However, that was not the situation in this 
case. The burden was upon Appellant to establish a defense, 
a lawful justification or an intention other than to drive 
Isom out of business. Calbom v. Knudtzon, supra, at 152. 
The record adequately supports the jury's rejection of 
Leigh's claim of justification. on numerous occasions Leigh 
was heard to complain--not about Isom's alleged failure to 
live up to the contract--but, rather, that Leigh "must have 
been crazy" to give Isom a ten-year lease and that Leigh had 
to get the business back so that he could sell the "whole package" 
for a greater profit. Having received the benefit of his bargain 
from Isom (e.g., $53,000.00), Leigh sought to deprive Isom 
of his benefit. 
As early as June, 1971, Leigh openly complained that he 
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wanted to sell the property but couldn't do so with Richard's 
lease. Leigh had to do something, he said, and the thing to 
do was to get Richard out. (Tr. 110-13) 
In August, 1972, Leigh again bemoans the ten years, wants 
to kick Richard out and sell the building. (Tr. 122-24) Leigh 
requests an appraiser to appraise the property without Isom's 
lease. (Tr. 273) Later, in 1974 when Isom tried to get Leigh 
to appoint an appraiser as required by the contract, Leigh 
boasted that he could sell the property for $200,000.00 and 
so there was no reason for him to honor his lease with Richard 
and sell the property for a lesser sum. (Tr. 158-61) Leigh 
again admitted he wanted Richard out so he could terminate 
the lease. (Tr. 169, 547) 
Appellant's self-serving claim that Leigh had "fully 
performed his obligations" (Appellant's Brief, p. 30) flies 
in the face of his own prior conduct and statements. The claim 
that Defendant was in default of the purchase and lease agreement 
is nothing more than Appellant's biased and brazened opinions, 
unsupported by the record. (Appellant's Brief, p. 30-31) The 
record does not reflect that Respondent ever refused to comply 
with the terms of the contract. (Tr. 110, 125, 155-56, 169) 
Even if Appellant were motivated by a desire to protect 
his contractual investment, his refusal to pay his maintenance 
bills, refusal to even respond to proper requests for approval, 
his attempts to sell the business to others, his reassertion 
of the Leany matter after it had been adjudicated, his refusal 
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to appoint appraisers and his attempts to impose extra-
contractual obligations on Isom are not in any way justifiable 
means to protect a purported investment interest. Respondent 
submits that Appellant cannot point to any properly protected 
interest that was served by Leigh's malicious, intentional 
attempts to force Isom to walk away from the store. 
Even more telling is Leigh's refusal to accept Isom's 
tender of the remaining balance due on the contract. If Leigh's 
motive was to protect his investment, why, then, would he not 
accept the final payment rendered five years before it was 
even due? The reliability of Leigh's testimony, which the 
jury weighed, is amply demonstrated in Leigh's letter to Isom 
wherein Leigh claims he has "no agreement" with Isom and is 
contacting people to sell the "complete package." (Exh. 65) 
Yet on the witness stand, ~~b~ claimed that the letter and 
his deposition testimony were a fabrication. (Tr. 636-39) 
Appellant agrees that the jury may look to a "predominate 
motive." (Appellant's Brief, p. 28) There was substantial, 
convincing evidence from which the jury properly found that 
the Appellant did not act reasonably to protect economic interests 
and that Appellant was not asserting honest claims against 
Respondent. (Tr. 622) Just because Appellant argues it is 
so does not make it so, ipse dixit. In its essence, Appellant's 
motivation throughout this transaction was "personal greed," 
which motive does not supply a justification for participating 
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in preventing performance. Corbin on Contracts, §654H (1980 
supp.) at 472. A person is not justified simply in attempting 
to further his own economic advantage at the expense of another. 
47 Northwestern L. R., supra, at 881. 
Appellant cannot be heard to reargue the evidence on appeal, 
The jury's is amply supported by the record. Skeels v. Universa: 
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir., 1964); Barlow v. 
International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 
(1974). 
Appellant failed to show any valid and proper interest 
which Appellant sought to protect. Appellant's conduct was 
clearly motivated by malice and greed sufficient to belie any 
claim that his actions were privileged. 
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POINT IV 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE FULL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES 
AWARDED BY THE JURY AND THEREFORE THE JURY'S VERDICT SHOULD 
BE REINSTATED BY THIS COURT. 
During the course of the trial, Respondent presented sub-
stantial testimony of the wilful, malicious conduct of Appellant 
and "Dub" Leigh to force Respondent Isom out of the furniture 
business so that Leigh could retake the business and property, 
after having received $53,000.00 on the purchase price. Appellant's 
harassment and intimidations effectively precluded Respondent 
from making meaningful business decisions or even attending 
to his business needs. (Tr. 386, 428, 611, 371) 
Based upon this and other testimony and Respondent's evidence 
that his compensatory damages were in excess of $100,000.00, 
the jury returned its verdict in favor of Respondent and against 
Appellant for the sums of $65,000.00 compensatory damages and 
$35,000.00 punitive damages. (R. 84) The court thereupon 
entered judgment for that amount. (R. 85) 
In response to Appellant's Motion for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict, claiming that excessive damages were 
awarded, the court properly stated the rule that punitive damages 
must bear a "reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages. 
However, the court then determined that a ratio of only 20% 
of compensatory damages was "reasonable" since that same 
approximate percentage had resulted in other cases. The 
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$35,000.00 in punitive damages was then reduced to $13,000.00. 
(R. 115-16) 
By imposing a fixed percentage ratio, the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion as a matter of law. The court 
did not even purport to make its decision based upon the facts 
of this case (which facts were the jury's prerogative to deter-
mine), but erroneously applied a mathematical ratio predetermined 
1 
by it on the basis of certain prior cases. [See Kesler v. 
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975); and Prince v. Peterson, 538 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975).) 
This Court has properly determined that it is the nature 
of the wrongful conduct, and not the amount of the actual damage 
awarded, that determines the propriety and amount of punitive 
damages. Nash v. Craigco, 585 P.2d 775, 778 (Utah 1978); 
"Developments in Utah Law," Utah Law Review 19 79: 34 7, 36 7-
68. In Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Ida. 902, 907, 453 P.2d 
551, 556 (1969), the Idaho court approved the rule that there 
is "no fixed or mathematical proportion, ratio or relation 
between ... actual damages and ... punitive damages, which 
in a proper case may be awarded . . . . In that case the 
court affirmed punitive damages of $12, 500. 00 compared to $350 .oo 
actual damages. See, also, Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 
41 (Utah 1980); Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011, 114 (Wyo. 
1975); and Oakes v. McCarthy, 267 C.A.2d 231, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127, 
147 (1968). 
36 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Evans v. Gainsford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952), 
this Court stated that there is 
no method of precise calculation as to the 
quantum of ... [punitive) damages, the exact 
amount thereof must necessarily be left to the 
sound discretion of the jury as related to the 
facts and circumstances in each individual case. 
247 P.2d at 434. 
This Court in Evans affirmed the trial court's award of punitive 
damages in an amount approximately equal to the special and 
general damages awarded--a far cry from the 20% ratio of 
"reasonableness" set by the trial court here. 
In Kesler v. Rogers, supra, the court repeated that 
. . . It is sometimes said that such damages should not 
be unreasonably disproportionate to the actual damages 
suffered or, perhaps more appropriately, to the nature 
of the wrong done and the injury caused. 542 P.2d at 
359. (Emphasis added) 
Unlike the instant case, Kesler and Prince v. Peterson, 
supra, involved suits in equity where this Court was able to 
review the decisions of the lower court as the trier of fact 
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. As 
previously noted, the court should not so regard the jury's 
verdict. Elkington v. Foust, supra, at 41 . 
. In light of Respondent's evidence that his actual damages 
were over $100,000.00, Respondent submits that the jury award 
of $35,000.00 punitive damages is not at all disproportionate 
but actually necessary to adequately reimburse Respondent for 
the tortious conduct of the Appellant. (Tr. 405, 272, 278, 
637, 313) such an award that merely restores Respondent Isom 
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and barely makes him whole cannot be said to be shocking to 
anyone's conscience nor indicate any corruption or passion 
on the part of the jury. Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 328 (Utah 1980), modified on rehearing, 
617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980). 
In his majority opinion, in Terry, Mr. Justice Maughan 
opined that because of the variables involved and the 
"imprecisions inherent in any award," the amount of a punitive 
award is in the discretion of the jury in the particular case. 
605 P.2d at 328. In that case, this Court reinstated the jury 
verdict even though the punitive damage award was substantially 
greater than the compensatory award. Upon rehearing, the re-
instatement was reversed because the plaintiff had not properly 
perfected her appeal. 617 P.2d, supra. 
Respondent Isom submits that there was no proper basis 
upon which the trial judge remitted punitive damages to less 
than one-half the amount awarded by the jury. The court's 
Order neither finds the award "shocking" nor engendered by 
passion, prejudice or corruption by the jury. (R. 115-16) 
It was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to remit any 
portion of the punitive damage award. The full sum of the 
jury's verdict should be reinstated by this Court--$65,000.00 
compensatory damages and $35,000.00 punitive damages. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence before the jury was more than sufficient 
to find that Appellant Leigh maliciously and intentionally 
interfered with Defendant's business relations and forced 
Defendant out of business. In no wise was Plaintiff justified 
in his tortious conduct. Therefore, the jury's determination 
of liability should be affirmed. 
With regard to punitive damages, the trial court erred 
in remitting a portion of the punitive damages as there is 
no evidence or indication of passions or prejudice or that 
the sum awarded was not reasonable. 
The jury verdict should be reinstated in its entirely 
by this Court and Defendant awarded $65,000.00 actual damages 
and $35,000.00 punitive damages. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of March, 1981. 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 south State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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Arthur B. Nielsen 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, HENRIOO, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Defendant 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-3350 
IN THE FIFTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
T. RICHARD ISOM, d/b/a 
RICHARD'S FINE FURNISHINGS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 5463 
Leave of Court havinq been obtained, Defendant hereby 
files his Amended Answer and Counterclaim against the Plaintif: 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Said Complaint fails- to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Answerinq the alleqations of said Complaint, Defendant 
admits, denies, and alleqes as follows: 
l. Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraph 1. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraph 2. 
3. Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraph J. 
4. Answering the all"egations of Paragraph 4' Defendant 
denies that he has breached the covenants of the contract between 
the parties and specifical~y denies the subparagraphs of said 
Paragraph 4 except as hereinafter admitted. 
(a) Defendant denies that he was two months de-
linquent in the payment of rent at the time of the commencement of 
this action. 
A PP€ f\J DIX ,4-1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
-2-
(b) Defendant denies that he was in default at any 
time in respect to the matte~s set forth in sUbparagraph (b) , but 
alleges affirmatively that if there had ever been any default in 
this particular, the same was waived by the Plaintiff. 
1 
(c) Defendant denies that he was in default in re-
spect to the matters set forth in subparagraph (c) at the time of 
the filing oL the action. 
(d) Defendant admits the provisions of the contract 
as therein set forth and alleges that he has performed the terms 
and conditions of said agreement in respect to maintaining an in-
ventory. 
(el Defendant denies that he has been in violation 
of the ?revisions of the contract referred to in Paragraph (e) and 
alleges that in a.ny event any failure on Defendant's part to comply 
strictly with the terms of such paragraph has been waived by the 
Plaintiff. 
(f) Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
subparagraph (f) and alleges affirmatively that any action in 
apparent derogation of the written provisions of the contract has 
been waived by the Plaintiff. 
5. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 5, Defendant 
denies each and every allegation therein contained and alleges that 
the security to be held for the Plaintiff under the agreement was 
greatly in excess of the $27,000.00 still owed under the contract. 
6. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 6, ·Defendant 
alleges that an audit was conunenced by Plaintiff's auditors and 
Defendant specifically denies that he has failed to comply in any 
way with the requirements therein alleged. 
7. Answering the allegations of Parag~aph 7, Defendant 
denies that he has in any way breached the agreement of May 14, 1970, 
entitling the Plaintiff to cancel the contract and terminating the 
Defendant's interests therein. Defendant further alleges that he 
A-Z.. 
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had prepaid payments on the contract and an additional payment was 
not due until December, 1975. Defendant further alleges that 
Plaintiff was offered the last $27,000.00 due Wlder the contract 
of May 14, 1970, but Plaintiff refused to take said payment. 
Defendant further alleges that the Plaintiff has never 
exercised any option to cancel said agreement and has not given to 
the Defendant any notice of intention to terminate said agreement; 
that by reason of said failure and also by reason of the Plaintif~'s 
refusal to accept the final payment of $27,000.00 due under the 
contract, Plaintiff is not entitled to have a cancellation of said 
agreement. 
8. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 8, Defendant 
denies that the Plaintiff is entitled to any relief thereunder. 
9. Defendant denies each and every allegation of 
Plaintiff's complaint not herein specifically admitted or denied. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
?urther answering said Complaint and by way of affirmative 
defense thereto, Defendant alleges that any failure on the Defendant's 
part to fulfill any of the terms and conditions of said contract 
has been waived by the Plaintiff. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Further answerinq said Complaint and by way of affirmative 
defense thereto, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is estopped to 
assert any alleged failure on the part of the Defendant to comply 
with the terms of said contract by virtue of the acts and con-
duct of the Plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment as hereinafte~ 
set :"orth. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
As a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff, Defendant al-
leges as follows: 
.:;. 7 
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1. On May 14, 1970, Defendant entered into the con-
tract with Plaintiff referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint, and 
pursuant to said contract the Defendant took possession of the 
property and business being purchased and the real property 
leased and commenced the operation of a furniture business and 
started the performance of said agreement. 
2. Approximately one year after entering into said 
agreement, Plaintiff commenced a course of intentional, wilfull, 
and malicious conduct designed to force the Defendant out of busi-
ness and designed to bring the business relationship to an end so 
that Plaintiff could take back the property. 
3. In furtherance of such plan and design, Plaintiff 
continually harrassed Defendant and made threats of cancelling 
said agreement. Plaintiff attempted to sell the business and 
property to others even though the agreement was still in good 
standing. 
4. At the time this action was commenced by the Plaintif=, 
Defendant was approximately ten months prepaid on the contract of 
purchase and at that time had paid S53,000.00 of the original pur-
chase price of sao,000.00, leaving only a balance of $27,000.00 
owing. Within two days after the action was filed and before 
swranons was served upon the Defendant, Defendant paid the remain-
ing $27,000.00 in escrow for the use of the Plaintiff and so no-
tified the Plaintiff, but the Plaintiff refused to accept said 
payment. 
s. The conduct of the Plaintiff as aforesaid, and in 
other particulars not specifically alleged, was malicious, wilfull, 
wanton and reckless, and desiqned to force the Defendant out of 
business so that the Plaintiff could retake and resell the prop-
erty to other parties at greatly increased profit, and said ac-
tions ~ave been carriedcn by the Plaintiff in reckless disregard 
for the rights of the Defendant and the Plaintiff's obligations 
under the c~ntract. 
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6. Plaintiff's course of misconduct caused Defendant 
to be evicted from the premises, forced Defendant out of business 
and into bankruptcy, and otherwise caused him to suffer loss of 
business and damage to his reputation, to his damage in the sum of 
$100,000.00; that Plaintiff's actions have been wilfull, malicious, 
and intentional, for which Plaintiff should pay punitive damages 
of $100,000.00. 
7. ·ay reason of the payments made by ~im, Defendant has 
an interest in the real property described in the agreement {and 
hereinafter described) , which interest should be determined and 
awarded to him. Any interest in said property determined to belong 
to Plaintiff should be impressed with a lien to satisfy any judg 4 
ment which Defendant might obtain against Plaintiff. 
The ground floor and basement and all other space, 
including the warehouse and outside parking area 
~ow used by the present furniture store on the prop-
erty at 8 East Tabernacle Street, St. George, Utah 
and desc=ibed as follows: 
Commencing at a point 37.5 feet east of the 
northwest corner cf Let 5, Block 15, ?lat A. 
St. George City Survey and running thence east 
78.25 feet; south 40 feet; east 16.5 feet; south 
92 feet; east 33 feet; south 119 feet; west 
165 feet more or less to the west line of 
Lot 5; thence north 197 feet 11 inches~ east 
37 feet 3 inches; north 53 feet 1 inch to be-
ginning, BUT SUBJECT to the right of way for 
the adjoining Watson property. 
BUT EXPRESSLY EXCLUDING all upstairs rental 
partments in the building on the property. 
8. Defendant is entitled to recover a reasonable at-
torney's fee in connection with this action. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment against the 
Plaintiff as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed. 
2. That Defendant be awarded compensatory damages in 
the S\Jl!\ of $100, 000. 00 and punitive damages in the s\Jl!\ of $100, JOO. oo. 
3. That Defendant's interest in and to the above-
described real property be determined and awarded to him and any 
,., ___ .~-~ 
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remaining interest of Plaintiff be impressed with a lien to se-
cure the payment of any judgment in Defendant's favor. 
4. Defendant prays for interest, attorney's fees, and 
for his costs incurred herein and for such other and further re-
lief as may be just and equitable. 
DATED this ~day of May, 1977. 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, HENRICO, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Defendant 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to Gary R. Bowe, 
Callister, Greene & Nebeker, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at his office 
address 800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, this 
-2ffeay of May, 1977. 
R-b 
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It is ag!"eed. tbat tb.e stock o: ::z:.e::-ct.c.:id!.se '..ti:: Oe ·so1c.: .. .-
i:i :be u.s1J.a: course o: -~l.i.s!.ness a.cc. w:. -::i. tb.a ~sua: ;iurchases and :-e-
placeme:its a.od also tba; t.::.e ~!.x;~es a..::d equipment w~ll.a!so be 
subject to rep:acemen: Out .ttat a:: ::-e?lacements ot merchandise and 
equipment shall be sub~ect to tbe seller's lien on said pro;>erty u.Dtil 
paid tor and in t.bis conr:ection, tbe seller agrees to t:ansfer tbe 
title to a:.y equipment ::::i.ecessary torreplacement. Also !;be i!ll.l.rcbaser; 
.agree a to_ keep .ip the mercb..,,d1se· 1nventocy at all t1Jnes so that 1t, 
together with :be casb. i:o.· the ba.zi~ and acccl.Ults receivable shall equal 
at least ~601 000.00. Tbe purC.:::.aser also agrees to furnish to the seller 
an accurate physical 1.nve~tory Of all merchandise and e~uipment each 
threa·montbs a::id also to supp~y !llOntbly t1::::i.s.c.cial s~atements. 
Tb.a seller hereby leases a.:ld lets to tbe purctaser 
the following described property: 
The term 
The grow:d floor and oasement and all other space, 
including the wa:-ebouse B.Dd outside parking area 
now used by tbe present fu!"Il~tur e store o~ tbe prop-
erty at 8 East Tabernacle Street, St. George, uta.b 
and described as follows: 
Commencing at a point 37.5 ~eet east at the 
nortbwest corner of Loo 5, Block 15, Plat A. 
St. George City Survey and rw:nin~ thence oast 
?d.25 tee~; soutb 40 feet; eas~ ~o.5 fee~; so~tb 
92 !eet; east 33 tee~; south 1:9 !eet; west 165 
feet mo~e o~ loss ~o ~~e west li=e at ~at 5; tbence 
nort= 197 1eet 11 inc1:es; east 37 feet 3 incbes; 
· ::iorth 53 feet : !.:Jc!: to beginning, BUT SUBJZCT to 
tbe rigbt at way tor 'the adjoining Watson property. 
BUT EX?:tESS:.Y EXC!.WJ:~G al.l upstai:-s rental par~ents 
in tbe bl.6.ild~=g on tbe ~:-operty. 
ot tbis lease shal: be !or ten y~ars !rom date, witb ~n opti~n 
to renew tor an add1t!onal 10 years under ~he same terms and Cond!t!ons 
tor the re-newal term 
except tbat the :ninl.mum ::iontbly rent/aa hereinafter set fprth aball be 
governed by the consumers' ?rice Index at tbe time of the beginni::g of 
the re-newal term as compared witb the Consumers' ?rice index at the 
using $600.00 per :ionth as the base rental. 
date bereotl. Tbe property is to be used at all times for the operation 
of a furniture and interior decorator store. Tbe rent sball be: paid· 
monthly and slla.11 be 3% of gross salas for the previous month, _pay.ao::..e 
on June lst, 1970 and on 'tbe same day ot each. :ontb.tbereatter, bu~ 
wi,th a mini:llum·monthly rent&.l of $500.00 per month in the· tirst ;ear 
of this leaae and a minimum monthly rental.of.$600~00.per month 
. '; 
•.· 
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"'::;:iereat:=e:•:. :t ::.s agreed -:::a~ tb.e se:.:er is t.:. ")ay a::. :-ea:. ~:-opi:r:i:: 
taxes a.ssesseC. aga~s': :::.e ?roper't'j a.:lC.. a:.so i.3 to 4':eep :t.e. ~Nv~. 
damage ca~sed to mercila::d!.se or tbe pi.ire.baser t:om t.b.e occu?~CJ 0 ~ 
tlle u.pstairs re:ita: ..:>!ts by ta.cants. 
Regarding tbe outside :;;.arl<O.:lg lot above re:erred ;0 , 
it is agreed tha :. tbe seller !.s res.erv!:ig tor tbe ase ot bis ups~a~:. 
apartme:it ta.can ts, parld:ig stalls :or 25 cars and tba t tl::e area ao· 
._·joining .tb.e st_ore on the was: s!.de trom 'tl:.e ate.re to ~e gutter~. 
to be 'used ~or store pa~k!.~g·duri~g s~ore hours Cut zay ~e ~sed a: 
night or wbe~ :be store i7 Dot opeD tor busi~ess, by te~s.::s a: 
tloe upstairs apartllle:>ts, wi tl:l all other space to be tl:le ;>arLi:g ""' 
tor the ;>urcbaser 1 s busi.cess. 
It is also agreed tbat tbe seller sh.al::. bave tbe ob:~. 
gatio:i ot all exterior mai:ite:iance a:id repa~rs to tbe b~i:d":g 
b1.1t tbat the pu.rcbaser shall bave tbe obl!.gat!.n= tor al: intarior 
repairs md re-modeli:lg a.cd decora:i.cg. It is agreed also :hat 
the p~rchaser s::allbave tbe obligation ot all :ria~tena~ce and 
repairs ot the lle&tiz:ig, air co:idi tio:i!::g, pluml>i::g a:id elactrica: 
systems tor the turDit~e s::ore space :aa~o~ ~o tb.e purc!la.ser to 
the extent _or the f'irst $500. 00 tor t!le cost or :-epai!"s and. rep!ae1· 
.me:>ta, with tbe seller sta.cdi::g all ax;>e.cse ot replacemei:ts a=d 
repairs-1:1 excess ot $$00.00 tor a:iy o:ie replaceme.ct or r<1paJ:. 
It !a t~tller .•r.••ti ~at tl:e ~patairs apar=ie.cta e~a:.: 
-:pay tor tlleir 0W?1· electricity and also tl::e. total cost o! llot wa:" 
· -llea ti.cg a:>d -also the purcbaser agrees to ma.1.c tai:> a.cd keep in opo:· 
atio:i the bot water beater a.cd turioace wlliclo supply the beat rw:d 
loot water tor tlle tur:>iture · at~re a.cd also- tlle '1;>stairs. apart:::e':' 
but !t ia agreed 'that tbe seller is to sta.cd and :pay oO:' ot the"" 
·· ot space,lle&1:!:>g, ;>ayable eacll :iio:itb beat is tur.cisloed tll• ap&rae:'· 
-It is also agreed tbat :io part ot tbe ;oroperty berei' 
/. qr tbis lea.se assigned 
leased may be sub-leased/to a::J.Y cellar ;oari:y witllo1.1t the con .. ct o: 
. tbe seller tirst load and obtai:ied. Tlle purcb.aser al.so agrees to li' 
- llis stock ot merc!:a~dise a.::d_ also tloe equipme:it i.nsured .aga1cst ;;:i 
by tire am alao to mai:ltai:: liability i:>aura.cce at all ti.mas.' 
~
.t Is ·.~g~eed t'Cat at sue::. tlone as ~he :::.: ---:-:~ 
.. 
A--~ 
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bava tbe _ap::.on to pi.;.Z"c::::iasa tbe a~ove desc:oibed :-eal p·rape:-ty, in-··.'-..· 
clu.c!..!.11g the ~?3':a:..:-s :-er.tal a:;:ia.:ot:::le::tz, a: a p:-ice :a b_e d.e;ar:ii;:ied 
by a coD:.!ttee ot tb:-ee appraisers, ~ne ot ~om.sball be appointed 
by tb.e seller, one by ~e ;HJ.:>c.b.aser ~d ;be two so appoin~e.d sball 
appoint a third member and all si:all be o"siness men or rEl'l estate 
appraiser• ot St, .George, Utah. Upon payc:.ent ot the P"rel>ase. price 
so dete.rm.ined, tbe purcl::iasers sbal.l be entitled to a Warranq- :Oeed. 
tor the prope:-107 and also an abstract ot title.or policy at.title 
insu.ra.cce, a.bowing t.itle, ·thereto to be 11 the 19::..ler, :"re• and olear 
· ot al·l lier:s, cla.!.:J.s, clouds and e:ccu:nbrances. ·•,.· .•. 
.-
It is ti.J.r'Cl:ler.agreed by ::!le parties, that tbe'above 
, descril>ed •tock ot merchanciise and equipment iu:d t!.%tures ·are being 
sold :~ee and clear ot all liens, cla!.:r..s and indebted.!less i~cu.rred 
prior 'Oo Ja.n .. acy l, 1970, with the purchasers to pay all cla!ms and 
indebtedness incu.rred &1"ter said date and tbe seller also agree s to 
comply witb _tbe Sulk ~ranster Laws at 
to thia sale. 
State ot Utah ill reference 
T!le seller expressly agrees that tor a p~~od ot ten 
years "trom tbe .. ,date bereo!', it will =o .. -c ei 1;l:er d!rectly or. i!lcilrectl:r, 
engage ~·or be co::ected with a tur::i~µre, ·appli&:lce or interior 
decorator store i:l wasbi!lgton c0wit7, 'Utab 8.Dd this restriction sl:lall 
also apply to ';be said w. S.Leigh personally, 
Time is ot tbe essence ot tbis purcbase ag!"eemez:i't· aod 
lease and in the •vent o: a de:a..it in any payment provided.tor herein, 
or a detault i:l the pertorm.ance ot &!ly other condition herein set 
forth and :or oO d&ya after said payment or pertormanca is d~e. the 
. . . ' 
seller may a'; its option, .cancel .and 'te:uillate this agreement and 
lease and be relieved of .all obligations ot perrormance and all pay-
ments thiu-etoforemade ·shall be forfeited as liq~id&ted damages 
and ·the •eller shall be entitled to tbe ill:mediata 'possession of the· 
,merchandise and property herei:l .. agreed to be. aold .. ~d also sbdl 
be entitled.·.to the poe.sessioz:i. ot tbe roal pro~er:' )erei:c· leased 
'··· .. ,,, 
~ '> - . :: ~ . 
<. -
"_. 
·' : . .'.':·~.~:·· 
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' ,~·v~o~~ :?.~~en~ !.:l :;~1. o_t. t~~- ~::=chase '.;);""ic~ ar.C. in-.:"re~~. 
ag:oeemer.t s:t:.a.:.l Oe ~ee:e~ .a. bill ·~.t. sal~ 'for. :be ~::ivaz::t.:cy 
ot ~erc=.a::ui~se, ,!~-:-~es anC. eqW.pmeu4; a.Ild personal p_rope!'1:y ';l:en 
.· .. ·:. __ -,•· ."1: •· ..... 
.. '"' - ~ .... 
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AGREEMfili T 
TSIS AGREEME.~T mace and entered into cilis ~ day 
of September, 1972, by and between LEIGH :'=ITUl\E !\ND CARPET 
COMPAbi"Y. a corporation, (hereinafter refer=ed to as "LEIGH") 
and T: RlCHARD ISOM (hereinafter refer=ed to as "ISOM") an in-
di~idua~ doing business as •Richard's F~ne Furnishings• of St. 
George, Utah, WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the parties to this Agreement had previously 
entered into an agreement dated the 14th day of May, 1970, wherein 
•r.eigh 11 as t.he seller and •tsom" as the purchaser agreed, among 
other things, as follows: 
a) 11Leigh 11 sold to •tsom" the complete i:.ventory and 
eq..;ipment of a furniture business located in St. George, Utah: 
b) 0 Lei9h 11 leased to azsom" certain real property 
located in St. George, Utah, said property to be used by "Isom" 
for the purpose of operating a retail furniture business. Lease 
was to run ten years with an option of renewal for ten years; 
c) •tsom• also was granted an option to purchase the Ieased 
premises upon payment in full of the purchase contract for the in-
ventory and equipment; and 
WHEREAS, there has accrued curing the term of the prior 
agreement various disputations between the parties thereto giving 
:ise to a threatened impairment of nleigh 1 s• security for completion 
ot the aforesaid a9:eement: and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are desirous of clarifying 
their respective positions relative to the prior agreement and 
avoiding any future conflicts arising from interpretation of said 
pr.:.or agreeme.."lt: 
-l-
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NOW TSEREFORE, Leigh Fu:ni tu re and Carpet Company, a 
corporation, and T. Richard Isom. mutually cove!'}ant and agree 
as follows: 
l. This Agreement does not alievate ~he obligations 
incurred by the parties pursuant to the agreement dated May 14, 
1970. Neither party relinquishes or waives any rights to en!o~: 1 ' 
t!'le terms of t.~at prior agreement. However, where t!'le terms ar.: 
covenants of this Agreement clearly and urunistaka.bly conflict 
with or ~edify the terms of the prior agreement, t~e te::ns of~ 
agreement shall gover:i the rights and obligations of t..'le par~:ei 
2. "Isom" aqrees to pay to 11 !..eigh u upon execution of 
this Agreement: the sum of Ten Thousand Dolla::s ($10,000.00). 
"Isom .. further agrees to pay to "Leigh" an additional Ten ~01m:_ 1 
Dollars ($10,000.00) on o:: before Janua::y 15, 1973. The afore· 
mentioned payments shall be credited to the unpaid pu::chase pr::, 
of the May 14, 1970, agreement and "Isom" agrees to continue t: 
make t.i.e lease and interest payments as set for"th in that ag:ee:r 
3. "Isom" agrees that should be default in making t:le 
payments provided for in the precedir.9 para9raph that he will 
immediately turn over the operation and management of the bus...::e! 
known as -·"Richard's Fine Furnishings" to "Leigh". "Isom" agreii 
that should said default occur t.'1e same shall te::minate all of 
"Isom's 11 claim. or right to enforce t..i.e prior aqreement of May l• 
1970. In essence, "Isom• a9::ees that default on this Agre.,..,,: 
will also ~. construed as a material breach of the former aqre~ 
and hence immediate forfeiture of "Isom' s" interest in said aqret· 
m.ent. 
4. It is agreed that for purposes of calculat.ing the 
$60,000.00 minimum of "merchandise inventory • . . toqetne: .,,:· 
the cash in the bank and accounts receivable• as pr::>vided for:: 
-2-
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~he second page of the prior agreement, there shall be deducted 
the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) from the inventory 
as indicated on the financial statement of "Isom". This sum 
represents a continge.."lt claim to inventory by Mr. ?:ancis L .. .Leany • 
.. Isom_'" does not acquiesce to t..'le validity of said conti.ngent claim 
but does agree to the :eduction for t..~e purposes set for'":...., above. 
·.s. It is agreed between t.."le parties that before "!som"-
sells, transfers or in any manner di!!uses his present ownership 
i:i.terest in the business known as "Richard's Fine Furnishings" 
or any furniture business wherein "Isom" has an ownership inte:es-: 
and which is located in St. George, Washington County, State of 
Utah, he shall first obtain wri'tten approval of "Lel.gh''. Ol.ffusion 
of "Isom' s" present ownership interest could take the for.n of a 
partnership arrangement (limited or general), sale of a portion of 
~he business, selling a corporate interest if the business is in-
corporated or any other method of reducing ~Isom•s .. present 100% 
o~ership of t.~e business. •Isom• shall seek approval by subtcitting 
a written request disclosing the person, persons or business en~ity 
that proposes to become involved, as an owner. or capl.tal investor 
of "Richard• s Fine Furnishings"' its successors and assigns. "Leigh .. 
shall respond to· "Isom's" request wit.'lout inordinate delay, by 
either approving said request or stating the basis upon which "Leigh" 
refuses the request. 
6. •Isom"' agrees that "!.eigh• is entitled to =ak.e bi-
annual audits of •rsom•s• business records beginning January l, 1973, 
and every six months t.~ereafter. •Leigh• agrees that said audits 
shall be made at nLeigh 1 s• expense and shall be so conducted as to 
avoid any interference with the normal operation of "Isom•s• 
business .. 
7. ..Isom" agrees to furnish "Leigh• a policy of fire 
insurance coveri~g the inventory of the furniture business wherein 
-3-
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.. :.eigh" s1;.a!l ~e desii;:ia.tad as a ":.Oss Payee... Sai.C. -;>o:.:..cy s~a:: 
be in an amou.nt equal to or exceeding t..":.e un?aid ba:.ance on t:.".e 
inve~tory-equipment ?U:c!lase aq:ee:.~~. :l:ai:ure to :la:..::..t.a:...~ sa;.: 
fire insura..--ice in !:-.:.ll force a.~d effect du:ing the durat.:..on ct 
t.~e p'IK'chase agreeme::.t shall const;.tute a Qatarial breac~ o! 
cont:act. 
'a. 11 Iso::." agrees t...~at "!.e:.;=." is er.t~-:.::..ed ':.o a sec:.;.::;: 
interest. :.n a.~d to al! a.c.::ounts receiv~la of "Ric~arci.' s P:..ne 
F..:rnishings". Isom f".l:t:"ler a;:ees to execute any arH:! al:.. docume:.:;: 
I 
o>ecess~ to pledge sud accounts raceivabla as securi~ for pay· I 
me.it of the balance of the i..'1.vent.ory-equipm.ent purchase agree.;.e:;, 
•r.eig:h" agrees t..'lat. upcn receipt of paymene i."l full of said ag:ee·I 
:ent, to release said security interest and also t..'le secur:.cy 
interest that "Leigh" present.ly has ir. 11 :soon 1 s" i..,ventor;, :ne:c:t· 
9. •Isom" ac;rees t..'"i.at a!-:er ~!le expi::a::ion of t..';.e pe::;: 
to which the prepayme..,t of pri~cipal is applicable as set for~:..'., 
paragraph #2 herein, he s!lall resu:ne payments on t.."'le u.npa_.d Cala:\ 
I 
.... required in the May l4, l970, as=eement. 
lO. •Isom 11 furt..i.er agrees to pay to "Leigh• t..'le sumo: 
T!lree Bundnd Fifty Six and 70/lOO Dollars ($356. 70). rep:ese.·.:::;i 
the l97l inventory taX mistakenly paid by "Leigh", said tax l>•'-'! 
Dated ~e date first appearing above. 
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( 
ll•ry a. 11...,. of 
CALL?sna, DSLD • CALLIIDR 
U'!Oalln'S roa Pi:..uJITin 
IVUS llOO DlnlZCOTT 8111LD?ll0 
SALT ~ CI'n', UTAll Nlll 
til:iill ... 363-3819 
'-:~ .... ~J!_·'" 
'ff ,<:>~ii/: !m: DIS'!'l.Ic:T COURT l'Oa WUBUOTCl9 coanr 
n.r.n or ll'TAll 
LllIQll l'VlllITOU: lllD c:unT 
COllPM11', • Vtah Corpor•tian, 
Pl•1atiff, 
-·-
T. llCll.UD ISOfl, dba Uc::BMD'S 
PISJ: PValiISBIMGS, 
!l' < ' 
C.i.v1l llo. 
.. 
·1 
ft• plaintiff c:omplaiH ot th• defendilllt, T. IU.c:hard laOll, 
and for .,.,. •• of ..:tian •lle9•• •• foll...,., 
1. fte plaintiff bere1n Ill • corpontian ahUn9 bf •irtue 
of the l-• of the State of vtah with iu princ:ip.11l place of l:la•i-
11••• ill Ce4ar City, Iran Coanty, ltate of Vtu. 
2. Defendant h • reaidmt of WHbin9toa Cowaty, wbereill 
... oper•te• • retail fllrlliblr• •tore kll- .. l.icbard'• rill• 
PunU.AiJ19a. 
t;~~; OD or ml>oat th• 14th day of .. ,. 1970, th• 
ad defendaat entered into • written 99r-at, • copy 
•ttmcbed hereto •• Dhillit •a• and by ref•r•c• aade • part lier~, 
wberebf the plaintiff (al Hld .. don• itma of u .... tozy aad eqaip-
Mnt for which thol defecdat ai,rHCI to aak• ~t and (b) t.he 
pl•intiff l•••ed t.o the def .. dmat 
HPP€NDIX D-J 
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4. Tl>e defendallt h•• aater1•llJ breached the co•elZlti 
of Ula afor-t1caed contract I.A the followiAg •llnAer 1 
(•) tba deflllldaat u two •ontha delinquent ill Hkl•i 
~-et principal md intenat Oil both Ula peracaal and real 
pr~ ~rUODa of tile 89&'-t • 
. -'-
(aot part of the in••ncory !oat fised UHta) w1thoat nplacing th! 
(c) tile def8Ddant agreed to nplace the stock of 
-rc:handia• aold in the ordinary coar9' of bual.Aeaa, which dofed•1 
J:au a.ot done. 1 
(d) Defendant 99rffd to keep tlle -rchandiH l.D•Hto~ 
caah in bank and accCMU1ta recei•ule at all tia .. in an mount~· 
to do, 
(e) Def8Ddant agEeed to furniah the plaintiff ... ' 
accurate physical in•entory of all -rchandiae and equipoent ucb 
I 
thr" •ontlla and alao to Apply -thlJ hoa.cial atat-tl' die!' 
defendant haa partially failed to ccaply with or haa Ilea 1111n11oo·I 
' 
uly alow in faroiahiog aaid atat-ota. i 
(fl Jt waa f1lrtber agned by tile defeodant that ill 
co.:di'!-iaio9 and electrical ay•U.a for th• farn1ture aton 11"" 
... ::·!.;-
•118998 that defendant hu fail.ad to p.y for npaira th•t lien 11111 
pertoraed oa Hid plaaloin9, heat1A9 and air cond1t1cmio9 aytteal• 
(g) Plaintiff llel1eN• 1111d therefore dl•CJ•• •P"" 
aac:h l.Afomat1on and !Mllaf tl>at def8Ddaat hu aul>-l•t certaiA 
porUana of pr.al.•-· 1A partie11lu, certain parkiJlg u:eaa. I.I 
-z-
D-Z 
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the plaintiff aeeka an order of thia Coart terainatin9 defendant'• 
intereat in t.h• c<>11Uact and clirecUD9 th• defendut to 1-ediately 
•aa.~.\IM prMii••• allawin9 tlle plaintiff to take po•••••iaa 
·'">. ~:· 
~. 
4 ,. 
6. 1'be plaiAtif f reallagea par1t9rapha tl - t5 of plain-
1. Plaintiff allegea that puraaADt to tlle aforementioned 
c::>ntract the plaint:i. ff vaa grutad a Mc:urity intareat in all 
-rc:.b.andiM and in••ntory located on the buair>H• premiae• ;if th• 
defendant, including raplac ... nta and addition• to •aid merchandiaa 
' and equipment. 
i. ~· defendant furtllar indic:atad the nature of plaintiff'• 
which i• attached hereto aa &xhli>it •1• and by reference eade a 
part hereof, 
9. Purauant to tba dafudnt'• aoat recent balance (copy 
attached aa bhibit "C") tba defendant'• iAventoria• of -rchanc:iH 
i• liatad aa •54,743.70, howe•ar, plaintiff allege• tllat aaid in-
•-tory i• 09eratatad by f4,000.00, ••id •ount rapreaenti.llg 
in•entoS'J belonging to Jlr, l'rancia Leany aa per page one of the 
abo91A lla properly •boon> u '50, 743. 70. 
·--="- ~­ ~ .. 
, ..•..• ui. Plaintilf belie••• and UpOll informatiOll and bali.e6 
allege• that tlaa ac:co-ta Payable a.11- an SZllibit •c• of 
'52,156.60 repraaent alaoet eAtirelr creditor8 vlao ba .... •applied 
in.._tory to tba defandaat. 
tl, &ltltougb plaintiff claiaa a priority interHt in the 
llfo ... aaJ.d •rcbandiM iA-toZ]' it ia appazeDt that plaiJltiff'a 
cl818 of f47,000.00 dae ca tlaa ooaUact betveea plaiAtiff and 
-3- D-3 
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• 
detendMt i• in ••riou• jecpardy fr,. elai•• of ereditou •h•Zllo 
tl>e pl•int:i.ff would l>e •lll>Jected to n,..erou• defen••• ot 11:1 
priority poaitian. 
u. Plaintiff aUe9•• that the defendant hH a ciu:ront 
in••MlrJ' of •so, 743. 70 •:i.th real Md poaaJ.l>l• or eonti:lqut •lllai, 
to ilaid iierc:l>Mdiff in tile ...,...,t of fl00,3S2.88. (Pl.unutt•1 
c:laill of f47, 000.001 ia•eatory m:editor•' c:Laa of Ul, U6 • .a1 11d 
accrued tmiee of f2,1'6.21). 
lJ. Plaintiff all999• tllat ita •ec:or1ty po•itia11 I.JI 
aaterially tl>z:eatened by tl>e c:urrat financ::i.el •tatua of the d .. 1 
fendant'• bu•ineur thet anl••• a receh•d ia appointed by the eo.I 
!Jmediataly the plaintiff •tand• to lo•• aonaideral>le in .. 1taont u 
will other c:reditor• of the defendant. lfberefore the plaintilf 
allege• that it would l>e in ti>• beat int•raau at. all ;-artie1 coo• 
1 
c:erned th•t the C~t .. t a time and pl11ee for a he•r1nq puuuant 
to &ule 66 of the Ota!> aulea of Ciwil Procedure, for th• parpcP : 
o.f appointin9 a bc:eiwer to tD:e 1-diate operatioc of 1Ucbatd'1
1
. 
Piu rurniabin9a for the protectian of plainti.ff aad otller crril~~ 
of the defendllllt. 1· 
14. Plaintiff l>eli•••• ad •11•9•• apon aocb belief t111t 
I 
l>ec:•o•e of the aatore of defeadaat' • l:la•in••• •11 in•entocy to >lid, 
plaintUf'• eec:oril:J' interaat •ttac:hea 1• mol>jec:t to r•09al, d""' 
of ~inll loet or liqaidatioe. 
tcdaat u fol.1011111 
nuT c:.\lllS or M:ftc. 
l. J'CN: terain•tiae of ~ coaUect (h.bibit "A") porsullt 
to the tanaa of aaid c:ODtzaort arida9 fr- dd•du&'• .. urill 
br•ach of the ..... 
b-4 
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2. f:>r .., order of the C:nart diracti.119 defendant to t11rn 
over U...di•t• poaaeaaicm of th• pr .. iaea, incloding th• aerchandiae 
J. lor the !Orefeitore paraoant to the CQDtr8Ct, Of all 
--ta peid p11rauant to the COllUact aa liquidated d-ag... . .cc~· 
'· ror coeta of COOU't illc11rred herein ud a11ch other -4 
furtber reliaf u the C<>ut de ... j11at to .. ud in th• pr•i•••· 
1. ror teraination of the COlltract (Ezhibit "A") por•uet 
to t!le ter•• of Hid contract ariaing fro. de!endaat'• !>reach of the 
...... 
2. ror tlle appoiataeDt of a llecaiver puuuaat to bl• 6&. 
Ot&ll Rulea of Civil Pr.,.,edure to take iluaediate poaaa••iQQ Of the 
buain••• kn"""' •• Richard'• fiD• ruriai•bin9• to either liquidate 
the •- or to operate the bu•in••• ontil •ac:h time u the CQQrt 
deceit appropriate to liquidate the llaaiD••• or •hoold the boai-
n••• ••tabliab a aore •t&llla financial •tatoa, thu to tarn the 
operation OYer to the defendant. 
l. ror co•ta of coart incurr•d llerein ud •ac:h other and 
further relief u the Coa.rt da_. juat to .. ard in the pr-iHa. 
Dated thia _ day of lepteaber, 1972. 
Adit"eH Of Pl•intif f 1 
Cedar City, Otab 
ft /8/ Q!n a. ..,... 
-5-
Attorney• for Plaiat•f f 
laita 800 IEeDDeCott ... ildia9 .·. 
lalt Lake Cit7, vtah IMlll. ~-~· 
-:~····~·':. 
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Gary R. Howe 
CALLISTER, GREENE l NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone 531-7676 
IN THE DISTRlCT·COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
................ 
LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET 
COMP ANY, a Utah Corporation , 
Plaintiif, 
COMPLAINT 
vs. 
T. RICHARD ISOM, dba RICHARD'S 
FINE FURNISHINGS, 
Civil No . .5 .y"t 3 
Defendant . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The plaintiff complains of the Defendant, T. Richard Isom, and for cause 
of action alleges as follows: 
1. The plaintiff herein is a corporation existing by virtue o! the laws of the 
State of Utah with its principal place of business in Cedar City, Ir<>n County, 
State of Utah . 
2. Defendant is a resident of Washington County, where he operates a 
retail furniture store known aa Richard's Fine Furnishings. 
3. On or about the 14th day of May, 1970, the plaintiff and defendant ente1'd 
into a written agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto a.s Exhibit "A" and by 
reference made a part hereof, whereby the plaintitf (a) sold various items of 
inventory and equipment for which the defendant a~eed to make payment and 
(b) the plaintiff leased to the defendant a retail furniture store located in St. 
George, Washington County, State of Utah. 
4. The defendant has materially breached the covenants of the a!oremention~ 
contract in the following manner: 
(a) The defendant is two months delinquent in making payment on 
, the lease portion of the agreement. 
I f?pp€1'/{)t)( E-1 
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(b) The defendant has sold various sewing machines (not part of 
the inventory but fixed assets) without replacing the same as agreed to on page 
2 of the agreement. 
Cc) The defendant agreed to replace the stock of merchandise sold 
: in the ordinary course of business, which defendant has not done. 
:1 (d) Defendant agreed to keep the merchandise inventory, cash in 
:! bank and accounts receivable at all times in an amount equal to or in excess of 
,1 
'; $60,000.00 in value. which defendant has Called to do. 
(e) Defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiff "an accurate physical 
inventory of all merchandise and equipment each three months and also to supply 
monthly financial statements" which defendant has partially failed to ccmply with 
or has been unreasonably slow in furnishing said statements. 
en Plaintit! believes and therefore alleges upon such information 
': and belief that defendant has sub-let certain portions of premises, in particular, 
,i certain parking areas, in contravention of the agreement. 
5. The plaintiff believe• and alleges upon Information and belief that the 
1 
present market value of defendant's given inventory is less than the amount due 
and owing to the plaintiff pursuant to the attached agreement. That amount being 
1 
in the sum of $27 ,000.00'. Plaintiff further alleges upon Information and belief 
1 that defendant's equity interest in the available inventory is virtually nil. 
6. Plaintiff has requested the opportunity to take a physical inventory and 
;1 complete audit of defedant's business at plaintilf's expense. Said audit having 
;1 been agreed to by defendant in an agreement between the parties dated September. 
'! 1972; however, defendant has refused plaintiff's request for such an audit. 
7. Pursuant to the default provisions of the attached agreement the plaintiff 
1 seeks an order of this Court terminating defendant's Interest in said agreement 
'! and directing the defendant to immediately vacate the premises allowing the 
plaintiff to take possession thereof. 
s. In the alternative the plainti!f seeks a Temporary Restraining Order 
from the above-entitled Court re•training defendant from further conducting 
E-2 
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.i 
!I business in any manner whatsoever at the location of "Richard's Fine furnishl!lg
5
. 
;1 in St. George. Utah, until such time as a complete certified audit can be takenol 
I 
·: said business. Plaintiff further requests that i!, in fact, said audit Should disdo;. 
that plaintl!t's security is in jeopardy or that the terms and conditions of the 
'i attached agreement have not been complied with by the defendant as alleged he~, 
.
1 
that pursuant to Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a receiver be appoc: 
:
1 by the Ceurt for purposes of liquidating the existing inventory pursuant to the 
:1 terms and conditions of the attached agreement. 
WHEREFORE , plaintiff pnys for judgment against the defendant as follows: 
I 
I. For an order of the above-entitled court terminating defendant's intem1 
1
. 
in the agreement dated the 14th day of !\lay , 19 70, and vesting in plaintiff immeifu:• 
I 
possession to the premises descrll>ed in said agreement. ! 
2. That a Temporary Restraiiting Order be issued forthwith restrainingd&j 
from further conducting any business whatsoever at the business known as 
"Richard's Fine Furnishings," St. George, Utah, until such time as a certified 
audit can be taken and filed with the above-entitled court. I! in the opinion oi 
1 this court the aforesaid audit evidences a failure on the part of the defendant to 
, maintain proper security for repayment of the obligation presently due and OWlll! 
: to the plaintiff, that in that event a receiver be immediately appointed for purpoS< 
of liquidating the business known as "Richard's Fine Furnishings." Said liqwd!:i 
to proceed in accordance with the terms and conditions o! the May 14, 1970 
!!agreement. U reasonable liquidation tails to produce the sum of $27 ,000.00 
:ithen upon said occurance plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant for 
I the amount of said deficiency. 
3, For other and further relief as the Court deems just to award in the 
11 premises . 
,I DATED this -11....~ll'f of February. 1975' 
--&:? ,{'. """ Gary R Howe --
I 
' 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I served the forgoing Brief by 
mailing two copies, postage prepaid, to Gary R. Howe and 
w. Clark Burt, 800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84133, Attorneys for Appellant, this 26th day of March, 1981. 
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